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"Tragically again, of the approximately 20 Christians who
were killed [by Muslims] in the village of Benteng Karang, 15 of them
were them were burnt alive. One of them was Mrs Rina Serpiela, a
six-month pregnant woman who was killed by having her belly ripped open
and the foetus pulled out and burnt alongside her. This event was
witnessed by her husband, Yopy Serpiela. Meanwhile her two-year
old child was kidnapped and used as a shield by the attackers from the
rocks thrown by the defending Christians." [1]
In the absence of any other facts, the above passage would -- for
most normal people -- inflame the emotions to the point of hatred
towards the perpetrators of this violence. In this case, the
perpetrators are called "Muslims".
It has been said that the first casualty of war is the truth. This is
no less true for the inter-communal war currently raging in
Maluku. 'Facts' become relative. Hatred increasingly
consumes the partisans, to the point that they find it difficult to
believe that the other side could harbour any good human qualities
whatsoever.
Maluku -- an archipelago known as the "Spice Islands" in times past
-- is a province of Indonesia, comprising about 1,000 islands in the
eastern part of the nation, with a population of a little over two
million people. Today, 54% of the population profess Islam as
their religion, and 44% refer to themselves as Christian. Ambon is
both the name given to an island, and to the provincial capital.
The majority of Ambonese on Ambon ("central" Maluku) are
Christian. The northern part of the province, predominantly
Muslim, was broken off to form a new province of North Maluku in 1999.
Nominally at least, Indonesia is a predominantly Islamic country
where nearly 90% of the population carry an ID card (KTP) identifying
themselves as "Muslim".[2] In fact, the
proportion of 'practicing' Muslims -- which is to say, the santri or
muslimin -- is less than 30%, and most of these muslimin
follow a relatively open and tolerant form of the religion.
The recent and continuing problems that have emerged in Maluku are
not simply local issues, though they may well have started that way. The
war is inextricably linked to events in Indonesia as a whole, and to the
competition between powerful forces located in Jakarta, more than 1,400
kilometres away.[3] The centres of this
war are the cities of Ambon (central Maluku), Jakarta, Makassar (South
Sulawesi), and Yogyakarta (Java), and to a much lesser degree, Kupang
(west Timor).
There are three main forces at work in Maluku at this moment:
* Local ethnic rivalry between the indigenous Ambonese
and migrants from South Sulawesi;
* Imported religious rivalry between Christians and
Muslims, in particular modernist Islam;
* Local and imported provocation from elements of the
Indonesian military and Suhartoists.
Through a process of coincidence, opportunism and plain old-fashioned
reductionism, the protagonists in the war in Maluku are now referred to
as "Muslim" and "Christian". This has had the effect of expanding
the conflict into the national and international realms.
Like many communal wars, it is necessary to examine history to
properly understand the roots of the conflict. In the case of
Maluku, we must start by looking back to the beginning of the 16th
century, when the islands now known as Maluku caught the attention of
aggressive and expansionist Europeans seeking wealth from spices.
It was the lure of spices - in particular cloves, nutmeg and pepper -
and the desire to cut out the middlemen of the Middle East, which first
drew European privateers into the region.[4] The nature of
European impact was highly varied throughout the region, and the force
of this impact was very uneven, slow and haphazard. For some time
Europeans were just another nationality entering the markets of the
region. [5]
The Portuguese were soon supplanted by the Dutch as the main European
presence in the island trade region. After the seizure of Ambon in
the Maluku in 1605 and Banda Island in 1623, the Dutch secured the trade
monopoly of the Spice Islands. A policy of the ruthless
exploitation by 'divide and rule' tactics was carried out.
Indigenous inter-island trade, like that between Makassar, Aceh, Mataram
and Banten, as well as overseas trade, was gradually paralysed. By
1817 the Dutch had completely regained control of the islands.
Many islanders converted to Christianity, the religion of their masters.
In 1945, following the occupation of Maluku by the Japanese during
the Second World War, the archipelago formed part of the Dutch-inspired
autonomous state of "East Indonesia". Southern Maluku, led by
Christian Ambonese, revolted against the Indonesian government in 1950
and formed the short-lived Republic of South Moloccas (Republik Maluku
Selatan, RMS). Ambonese, those who adopted a Christian identity in
particular, had a much closer relationship with their Dutch masters than
did the other nationalities of the Dutch East Indies. For
centuries, in fact, Islam was one of a number of weapons used against
the Dutch in the war against colonial occupation. Islam was a
point of differentiation with the occupying Europeans.
The closer identification of Christians in eastern Indonesia with the
Dutch made them vulnerable to charges of collaboration and betrayal by
those in the rest of the Dutch East Indies who demanded independence
from the Netherlands. Sukarno's proclamation of independence, just
a few days after the surrender of the Japanese in August 1945, declared
all of the area formerly occupied by the Dutch to be a singular and
unitary republic called 'Indonesia'. Many areas of the East Indies
did not necessarily identify with this pan-Indonesian view, amongst
them, Maluku, especially the more Christianised central Maluku and North
Sulawesi (Manado), who were suspicious of domination from both Java and
from Islam.[6]
In an attempt to stave off complete independence and a unitary
Indonesian state, the Dutch tried to establish a number of smaller
dependency states, including one called 'Negara Indonesia Timor' (State
of East Indonesia) that joined Maluku and Sulawesi. This was very
much a rear-guard action by the war-weakened Dutch, and by the 21 April
1950, 'East Indonesia' was absorbed into the unitary Indonesian
republic. However, a few days later, mainly Christian separatists in
Ambon unilaterally declared a Republic of the South Moloccas.
After a bloody war lasting until December 1950, the Indonesian
Republicans finally prevailed.[7] Over the following
decade tens of thousands of Ambonese Christians either fled, or were
forcefully deported to, the Netherlands[8] where they remain a
distinct community to this day.
For decades afterwards, a lingering doubt hung over the patriotism of
Ambonese Christians in a nation where Indonesian nationalism is
extremely strong. The Indonesian military especially has a very
long collective memory, and judges especially harshly those who
'betrayed' the Indonesian republic during and just after the war of
independence. Events such as these have become part of the lore of
the armed forces, propagated faithfully and continuously for decades to
the Indonesian masses by a compliant media.
Starting in the mid-1950's, the Indonesian state began its
slow-but-sure descent into demagoguery and authoritarianism, culminating
in the coup d'etat led by General Suharto in October 1965, and
its subsequent cataclysm. A massive slaughter of 'communists'
ensured, conducted by the armed forces in alliance with members
Nahdlatul Ulama, a mass organisation representing millions of
traditionalist Muslims mainly in Java.[9] Estimates of those
butchered range from 500,000 to 1,000,000.
In 1966, the RMS set up a government-in-exile based in the
Netherlands. Its influence in Ambon, however, was extremely weak,
and serves more as a thorn in the side of Indonesian nationalism rather
than an actual threat. A very few die-hard RMS supporters in Ambon
periodically raise the RMS flag, causing consternation amongst
hyper-nationalist supporters of the Indonesian state, but that is the
about limit of their activity in Ambon.
The passage of laws on local government in 1974 marked an important
milestone in the development of the present conflict in Maluku.
These laws severely weakened the traditional pela alliance
system, and the raja system of government, and allowed a voice
for the ever-increasing number of migrants in the province.
Migration into Ambon -- especially Bugis, Makassarese, and Butonese from
southern Sulawesi -- upset the delicate ethnic-religious balance that
had previously existed, and gradually over the next decades caused a
breakdown in the traditional authority systems.[10]
Before the war broke out, Ambon had long been portrayed in the
Indonesian media as a land where relations between Christians and
Muslims had always been harmonious, the tranquillity of interfaith
relations protected by the pela alliance system. Under this
system, a village of one faith was "twinned" with a village of the
other, with both charged to defend the others interests in the event of
conflict.[11] Whilst the
reality on the ground was certainly different, the mere belief that
there still existed a pela system served to keep the communities
in balance.
From 1980 and into the nineteen-nineties, there was a steady rise in
influence of migrants in Ambon, which also corresponded to a 'greening'
of Indonesia under the New Order regime giving Islam a much more central
place in the life of the state. The migrants moved into the
commercial sectors, especially transportation, displacing many Ambonese
in the process. Increasingly also, Ambonese Christians were being
pushed out of their traditional employment in the civil service,
schools, and police. The Bugis in particular organised themselves
into tight associations with strong political clout.[12] The Christian
Ambonese were being effectively 'swamped', both ethnically and
religiously; a situation that suited the revengeful ABRI[13] and New Order
government.
Communal relations, clearly, were extremely poor even before the
violence erupted, with street fights regularly occurring between Muslim
and Christian villages in Ambon.[14]
The political, social and economic chaos that hit Indonesia starting
in mid-1997 significantly increased the ethnic and religious tensions in
many parts of Indonesia, Ambon included. Suharto was politically
crippled by the economic collapse, and by May 1998 he was forced to
resign after months of violence on the streets of Jakarta. During the
Jakarta riots thousands of mainly-Christian Chinese were slaughtered
and/or raped, and there is much compelling evidence implicating the army
in provoking this violence as part of a last-ditch effort to shore up
the regime.
Suharto's handpicked replacement was BJ Habibie, a "Dan Quayle"
vice-presidential figure who had the Indonesian presidency dropped into
his lap. Habibie was previously the head of an important and
(then) prestigious Islamic organisation called ICMI (Organisation of
Islamic Intellectuals) formed by Suharto as part of his Islamisation of
the New Order state, and as a counterbalance to traditionalist Muslims
like Gus Dur.[15] BJ Habibie is a
Makassarese (South Sulawesi), and, as is the tradition in these parts,
filled his cabinet and high government posts with people from his home
province.[16]
It was against this background that the stage was set for an outbreak
of open hostility in Maluku. Two events triggered the
outbreak. The precursor event happened on the 22 November, 1998,
when anti-Christian/Chinese riots in Ketapang (Jakarta) caused the
deaths of 13 Christians, six of them Ambonese. Twenty-two churches
were also burned or damaged.[17] In apparent
retaliation, and with the suggestion of provocation from Suhartoists,
reprisals took place in predominantly-Christian Kupang (West Timor),
causing damage to at least six mosques, but not resulting in any
deaths.[18]
The second trigger event occurred on the 19 January 2000, towards in
the end of the Islamic fasting month of Ramadan. A seemingly
inconsequential dispute between an Ambonese bus driver and two Bugis
street thugs turned into a conflagration, firstly engulfing Ambon, and
then other islands of Central Maluku. Dozens were killed, both
Christian and Muslim.
Over the next few months the incessant violence in Ambon left
hundreds dead, and forced tens of thousands flee to other provinces. The
army and police were (and remain) completely ineffective in controlling
the violence, and in fact became partisan participants. In
February, the first calls were heard for a jihad to be conducted
to 'save' Maluku Muslims from the Christians. Jakarta-based
Ambonese gangsters with strong links to the Suharto family have been
reported as being behind these calls.[19] False reports of
Muslims being killed at whilst prayer inside a mosque widely circulated
by Indonesian media, provoking violent responses and massive
demonstrations from Islamists around Indonesia.[20] Muslim youth
groups throughout Indonesia, but especially in Java, called for a
jihad and started a campaign of signing up members to fight in
Maluku.[21] By April 1999 the
violence had subsided somewhat, taking a breather ahead of the
Indonesian elections held on the 7th of June, and coinciding with an
escalation of activity in East Timor by TNI-backed militias.
On the 27th of July, the war re-started in earnest.[22] However, the attention
of Indonesia and the world generally was shifting to other hot spots, in
particular, East Timor. In the middle of August, a few weeks after
the plebiscite, TNI-backed militias in East Timor started their
destructive rampage. For many Indonesians, the message sent by
this destruction was unmistakably clear: provinces daring to break away
from the Indonesian state would suffer terrible consequences in terms of
loss of life and property.
By mid-September, Indonesian hysteria over East Timor had reached
very high levels. A few days before Australian troops entered East
Timor on the 20th of September, the Indonesian military renounced the
security treaty it had with Australia, and Habibie dutifully followed
suit by formally revoking it. A month later, Gus Dur assumed the
Indonesian presidency, to the great despair of Megawati's supporters.
Meanwhile, the violence in Maluku continued, spreading more intensely
to other areas of the Maluku archipelago. In the newly-proclaimed
province of North Maluku from the beginning of November to the end of
December 1999, almost 1,000 people died.
Fanatical Islamists in Jakarta started a massive campaign calling on
Muslims to jihad in Ambon. Thousands heeded the call,
signing up enthusiastically.[23] On the 17th of
January, anti-Christian riots start in Lombok that were strongly
suspected to have been started by a group calling itself "Laskar Jihad"
("Holy War Militia"), a private Islamic militia formed specially to
intervene in Maluku.[24] There is strong
evidence of involvement and backing by certain New Order figures along
with the ambitious Sultan of Ternate (in Northern Maluku).
Between January and April of this year (2000), Maluku was relatively
quiet, though still extremely tense and dangerous, due mainly to a
massive military deployment and a purge of army units known to be siding
with the Muslim side. However, this was not to last.
By early May, Laskar Jihad were entering Maluku. According to
some reports, at least 2,000-3,000 are now active in the province, with
thousands more in reserve at the organisations headquarters in
Yogyakarta. The war flashed again to full intensity, and at the
time of writing shows very little sign of abating any time soon in the
near future. An estimated 6,000 people have so far been killed
since the war started 18 months ago.[25]
It is undeniable that there existed considerable ethno-religious
tension in Maluku before the outbreak of open hostilities on the 19th of
January, 1999.[26] However, it is
increasingly clear that the protagonists, Muslim and Christian, are
being played like puppets, with the strings stretching all the way to
the dalangs in Java.
The traditional consociational pela system that had existed
for hundreds of years up until the mid-seventies kept Christian-Muslim
tensions between Ambonese in a relatively stable state. Whilst far
from perfect, and while the benefits and operation of this system was
often far short of its expressed ideals, it nonetheless worked well
enough to maintain a semblance of social peace between two rather
incompatible worldviews.
Tension between the two communities, Ambonese Christians on the one
hand, and Ambonese Muslims and Muslims from various migrant groups on
the other, was so high that it would have taken very little provocation
to ignite an explosion. Once the violence began, however, it
quickly fed on itself, dragging out historical grievances, creating new
injuries, and generating new, deeply felt communal suspicions.[27]
The steady and increasing influence of external factors into Maluku
-- starting with the events that occurred during the Indonesian
anti-colonial war through to social displacement by immigrants from a
traditionally hostile ethnic group into the Maluku environment, along
with central government interference in traditional systems of conflict
resolution and social control -- all contributed to the conflagration
presently occurring.
Even given all these factors, however, the war on the scale being
witnessed at the moment could have been avoided if it were not for
actors outside Maluku callously using the situation to further their own
power agendas. If it were not for this outside interference, there
may well have been hope to retrieve the situation.
Given what has occurred in Maluku over the past 18 months, with all
the death, savagery, destruction, fear, suspicion and complete breakdown
in trust, it seems that a resolution of the conflict will be
extraordinarily difficult to achieve. A return to the pela
alliance system will be impossible. Current central government
efforts to resolve the conflict have concentrated on the use of deadly
force to keep combatants apart, but this has not slowed the conflict; on
the contrary, it seems to feed it. Amazingly, real political
solutions have yet to be explored.
Some kind of partition will eventually be required to stop this war;
the formation of the North Maluku province may be part of an as-yet
unstated strategy by Jakarta to territorially separate the protagonists.
'Ethnic cleansing' of Christians is presently underway in this new
province. Central Maluku is more problematic, given the more even
numbers of Muslims and Christians. Forced or unforced removal may
not be an option here, so some form of internal partition will probably
be devised at some point.
Interestingly, Christian Ambonese support for a new state of South
Maluku is now evident. This was not at all the case just a few
years ago. Separatist pressures have probably developed as a
consequence of the complete failure of the central government to protect
Ambonese Christians. With disintegrative pressures on the
Indonesian state at an all-time high, the next few years may see the
formation of several new states on the periphery of Indonesia, and the
Republic of South Maluku may well be amongst them.
Notes
Yayasan Salawaku (1999), "Kronologis Kerusuhan Maluku (Ambon)", September 1999 at http://fica.org/hr/ambon/idKronologisKerusuhanAmbonSept1999.html. Translated by Gary Dean.
Religion in Indonesia has been effectively compulsory since 1965; a person not professing a religion is branded a communist, which is a very dangerous thing to be in Indonesia, even in this age of 'reformasi'.
Claudia Gazzini (1999), "Ambon: Government and military stir hate, says Bishop", Sydney Morning Herald, 24 August 1999. "'The problem is not in Ambon, it is in Jakarta,' the Roman Catholic Bishop of Ambon, the Most Reverend P.C. Mandagi, said."
Milton Osborne (1990), Southeast Asia: an illustrated introductory history, 5th ed., Allen & Unwin, North Sydney: 84
Osbourne (1990): 62
MC Ricklefs (1991), A History of Modern Indonesia Since c.1300, 2nd ed., Macmillan Press, Hampshire: 233
Ricklefs (1991): 233
Ricklefs (1991): 242
Nahdlatul Ulama was later to be led by Gus Dur (Abdurrahman Wahid).
Human Rights Watch (1999), Indonesia: the violence in Ambon, March 1999 at http://www.open.igc.org/hrw/reports/1999/ambon/
HRW (1999)
HRW (1999)
ABRI (Indonesian Armed Forces) was broken up in 1998 to become TNI (Indonesian National Forces, comprising the Army, Navy/Marines, and Air Force), and Polri (Indonesian Police).
HRW (1999)
The successful depoliticisation of Indonesia after the 1965 coup made Suharto more dependent on the armed forces, which was no longer kept in balance by a credible civilian political force. To strengthen his hand Suharto also needed some form of civilian backing, thus his playing of the "Islamic card" in the form of ICMI.
Two of these ministers, his closest allies, were later to be implicated in rather spectacular corruption cases, first involving the Attorney-General who was caught red-handed accepting a bribe to derail the Suharto corruption investigation, and the other involving the Bank Bali scandal where funds where redirected to buy votes in the People's Legislative Assembly to elect Habibie as president.
Jonathan Head (1998),"Call for calm in Indonesia: More than 20 churches were burnt in Jakarta last week", BBC, 01 Dec 1998
Straits Times (1998), "Mosques burned in reprisal attacks: Kupang's day of mourning for the victims of Jakarta's anti-Christian riots turns into one of vandalising Muslim property in the remote town", 01 Dec 1998
Atika Shubert (1999), "Indonesia's Hellish 'Heaven': Nation Imperilled As Religious War Divides Muslims And Christians", The Washington Post, 11 March 1999, page A23
South China Morning Post (1999), "Muslims take to the streets", 8 March 1999
Laskar Jihad is now headquartered in Yogyakarta after being pressured out of Jakarta. They are a daily sight on all intersections of the city, dressed in white Arabic-style clothing and Army boots, collecting money to fund their war in Maluku. Curiously, despite them being here for more than six months now, I have yet to see anyone at the intersections actually donate money, including modernist Muslims in similar dress. It seems the vast majority of Yogyakarta's muslimin are not at all impressed with this call for jihad, whatever they may think about the situation in Maluku. The question remains, therefore, where is the money coming from to fund these expensive para-military activities?
Coincidently (there are many coincidences in Indonesia) the riots restarted on the fifth anniversary of the storming of the PDI offices by Suhartoists in which a number of activists were killed. This was a seminal event marking the beginning of the end of the Suharto regime and the rise of Megawati Sukarnoputri as an opposition figure. Christians in Indonesia generally strongly support Megawati and her PDI-P party, and Ambonese Christians are no different in this respect. There may have been an attempt by Suhartoists to deflect attention from this anniversary by provoking violence in other parts of the country.
Jakarta Post (2000), "FPI to hold more rallies for Maluku", 12 Jan 2000
BBC (2000), " Tourists flee Indonesian resort", 18 January 2000
IndoEmail (2000), "Island jihad's menacing turn", published by the Australia-Indonesia Business Council (no author), 20 May 2000. Note that other media reports at this time claim lesser numbers of deaths, ranging upwards from 3,000.
Straits Times (2000), "Suharto's supporters blamed for unrest", 02 June 2000. "The Defence Minister alleges that the former president's loyalists are causing violence to 'anger and confuse' Gus Dur's government."
HRW (1999)
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