Traditionalist-Modernist Bipolarities in Indonesian Society

Gary Dean, April 1998 Reference: http://okusi.net/garydean/works/bipolarities.html

Indonesian society contains within it several strong and unique cultural expressions, or worldviews. One of the first social scientists to characterise some of these expressions was Clifford Geertz, who, in his classic work "The Religion of Java", put forward a taxonomy of the structure of Javanese society. Since it was published in 1960 this work has had and continues to have a profound influence on the way social researchers and Indonesianists view Javanese society.

Geertz divided Javanese society into three different types of worldview: the abangan, representing a highly syncretist animist outlook and associated with the rural peasantry; the priyayi, representing a Hindu-Buddhist outlook associated with the royal Javanese courts, but nowadays more associated with the bureaucracy, military elite and the educated; and the santri, representing an Islamic outlook and classically associated with small urban traders.

Geertz’s theory has many critics, in particular from Indonesian social scientists with an Islamic outlook. Zifirdaus Adnan, for example, complains that Geertz’s model is deficient because of the inappropriateness of including the priyayi as a category, insisting that priyayi is a class-based category and that it should be considered part of the abangan category. Adnan claims that Geertz’s abangan/priyayi/santri variants are based upon the religious orientations of the people. This view perhaps missed Geertz’s point in that he clearly considers his categories as "worldviews", and not solely religious or class orientations. Whilst it is true that the priyayi cannot properly be considered separately from the abangan, at least in a cultural sense, the priyayi worldview is clearly sufficiently different to justify a separate category. Using Adnan’s same line of thought, traditionalist santri should also be grouped together with the abangan on the basis that they share similar syncretic tendencies.

In an interview with Ummat, Dr Ignas Kleden is celebrated as a distinguished social researcher who "berhasil menggugat tetis-tetis Clifford Geertz, antropolog asal Amerika itu, secara kritis", ignoring an inconsistency, when, at the end of the interview, Dr Kleden praises a writer named Kuntowijoyo because he "menguasai betul persoalan abangan-santri-priyayi", thereby directly acknowledging the strength, impact and depth of Geertz’s classification.

Nearly 40 years after publishing his theory, Geertz continues to defend it staunchly. In a recent interview with Gatra, when asked whether his abangan-priyayi-santri typology continued to depict the contemporary situation in Indonesia, Geertz replies:

Ya, walau harus dicatat bahwa telah terjadi perubahan di sana-sini. Kalau harus menulis sebuah buku lagi tentang Indonesia, seperti yang saya lakukan pada tahun 1950’an, pada dasarnya saya akan menerapkan tipologi yang sama, mungkin dengan pengungkapan yang agak berbeda atau lain sama sekali.

Possibly one major problem with Geertz’s typology is that it generalises about a complex society where Indonesian people mix and merge within his categories. It is commonly observed that people of all Geertz’s categories can very often be found living together under the same roof. Very often also, particular people will not fit comfortably into any of Geertz’s categories, either straddling two or three of them simultaneously, or apparently falling outside his categories altogether. For example, the Chinese and Christians are all effectively ignored by Geertz, despite hundreds of years of influence in Java and Indonesia. The contemporary ‘middle class’ will also experience problems fitting comfortably within Geertz’s typology.

Nonetheless, it is the writer’s view that Geertz’s categories are sufficiently valid and useful to be employed in any analysis of contemporary Indonesia society.

Traditionalist and Modernist Outlooks

Before embarking on this investigation of traditionalist-modernist bipolarities, we need then to be clear by what is meant by the terms traditionalist and modernist.

For the purposes of this essay, I shall define traditionalist as that cultural tendency which looks backwards rather than forwards; that tendency which looks to the past and to adat; and to that tendency which sees no point in change. Traditionalism in Indonesian society is more associated with that section of society which is economically poor, whilst the modernist tendency is more associated with the richer parts of society. It needs to be stated that the terms traditionalist and modernist in terms of this particular essay should not be confused with the Traditionalist-Modernist bipolarity within Indonesian Islam.

Modernism on the other hand is characterised by a forward-looking outlook. It looks to the future, not to the past. It considers what is possible in the future. Indonesian modernism, both Islamic and Non-Islamic, looks to the West for its cultural cues. ‘Progress’ is one of the keywords of the modernist outlook, thus, for example, Golkar’s development ideology that is associated with the priyayi pole of influence, is very much a modernist outlook although greatly influenced by traditionalist abangan culture. The outlook of the secular, urban middle class is also modernist. It looks to the future in terms of its economic expectations and its aspirations for the future. The modernist looks outward, and to the broader picture, as opposed to the narrower view of the traditionalist who looks inward.

Multipolar Characteristics of Indonesian Society

The poles of influence that I shall discuss in this essay I have nominated as follows. The most obvious polarity within Indonesia as a whole (ie, not just alone) is between the Islamic and the Non-Islamic poles. The Non-Islamic polarity consists of the Chinese, who’s major influence is confined to the area of business; the Christians, comprising approximately 8% of the population; it also includes the secular, urban middle class, who although nominally Muslim, have an outlook which is not greatly influenced by Islam in their everyday life.

The Islamic polarity is also comprised of a number of different elements, ranging from the strongly syncretist Javanist who is only symbolically Muslim (‘Islam KTP’), through to the strongest of Islamic adherents, the santri.

The above diagram is necessarily crude and contains many obvious problems; omissions, generalisations.

The Abangan

The abangan outlook is the bedrock of culture in Java. It is from this foundation that most other cultural forms – priyayi and santri – are ultimately derived, despite the distance that these other cultural types attempt to place between themselves and the abangan form.

The archetypal abangan is conservative, tradition-bound, and tends to look backward to the past rather than forward to the future. For them, the world does not progress, but stands still, the objective of the social order being homeostasis and the preservation of social balance through conflict avoidance and an awareness of – or perhaps, resignation to – ones place in society.

Nowadays, the central manifestation of abangan culture is the selamatan, a simple ceremonial meal to which all neighbours are invited. It is this simple ritual which seeks to re-establish the harmony of the universe and neighbourhood. Selamatan are held to commemorate important moments in life, such as births, marriages, funerals, moving house, and such like. Selamatan are also held when it is felt that there is something not quite in balance within the social environment. The only other important abangan rite is the annual cleansing of the village (bersih desa) which is meant to get rid of evil spirits.

The abangan is a product of the desa, rather than of the city. The desa represents the agricultural heart of Javanese society. The passing of time is not marked by the social change, but by the ebb and flow of the natural environment; birth, death, planting, harvesting, volcanic eruptions, floods, droughts. Thus, there is no feeling of ‘progress’, but rather of an eternal unchanging cycle, supported by a belief that the world and social order must be preserved and not changed. This conservatism and resistance to change may also be reflected in the importance of ‘place’ within the Javanese mystical traditions in particular graveyards, volcanoes, caves, springs, or a particular tree in a forest. Such emphasis on the importance of place could perhaps contribute to an attitude of preservation and stasis, rather than of development and transformation.

The ‘Priyayi’

Classically the priyayi is that class of Javanese associated with the royal palaces who were co-opted by the Dutch colonialists to perform administrative and bureaucratic tasks. They perform no physical labour. This group is comprised of court nobles and non-royal members of the administrative class who adopt for themselves many of the features of Javanese court culture. The priyayi are a derivative – or a super-set – of abangan culture, and constitute the upper or ruling class of the abangan culture. Thus priyayi cannot be considered as something divorced from this culture.

In times past, schoolteachers, post office and railway office workers, and junior government officials were all considered priyayi. In addition to these, anyone who had obtained an education was also considered priyayi, thus the gates into this class were to some extent open to those born outside the class. It is the higher education and literacy of the priyayi which distinguished them, and which elevated them above the generally illiterate or sub-literate abangan masses.

The priyayi is extremely status conscious, and they will seek to increase their status by marrying into the aristocracy, and by emulating the lifestyle and attitudes of the royal courts.

Today, the priyayi as a distinct class should be considered in a broader context to include all the government bureaucracy and ABRI officers, and not just in Java, but over the whole of the Indonesian nation state. For more than three decades since the 1965 coup the Golkar-ABRI alliance has dominated Indonesia, and together they constitute a class separate and above the rest of Indonesian society. Holding aloft the torch of ‘development’ (pembangunan) they project an image of forward movement and progress, of modernisation and of an outward-looking attitude (‘era globablisasi’). Despite the somewhat politically ossified nature of this group, and the often merely symbolic nature of many of these images, the modern priyayi does nonetheless represent a force for change and thus modernism within Indonesian society.

The development of Golkar (Golongan Karya, "Functional Groups") itself began in the late 1950’s with a view to replacing the role of political parties. Although first promulgated by Sukarno, the idea was taken up by ABRI which established ‘co-operation bodies’ (badan kerja sama) through which military personnel worked with and within social and political organisations. The golkar concept was critical in enabling the army to better undertake its political role, later to be referred to as the dwifungsi (dual function) of the Indonesian military.

Golkar is thus very much a military creation, and this has led to increasing rigidity in the hierarchical structure and culture of the Indonesian bureaucracy, further reinforcing the already rigid priyayi bureaucratic hierarchical outlook. This obsession for rank extends way beyond what could be called the workplace, with even the wives of bureaucrats and military officers automatically taking on a social rank in accordance to that of their husbands.

Golkar-ABRI has controlled the political discourse in Indonesia for more than 30 years. Over that time this nexus has also controlled the very language of discourse. Bahasa Indonesia baik dan benar alongside the charged vocabulary of the New Order has substituted High Javanese as the language of the court. The New Order – which is to say, Golkar-ABRI – wants to project its own particular understanding of ‘development’, and language is an "all-pervasive agent" of this cultural hegemony, as observed by Keith Foulcher. Foulcher further observes that "the Indonesian language, the language of the state and it’s culture, is promoted as an agent of ‘modernisation’ and ‘national identity’, bringing together the technocratic demands of development with the symbols of priyayi Java."

The Santri

The santri in Geertz’s classical division of Javanese society is that group which more closely and devoutly adheres to an understanding of Islam. Whereas the priyayi and abangan are Muslim to the extent that they verbally acknowledge Islam as their religion, the santri identity with their religion and attempt to live according to their understanding of Islamic precepts. Their religious outlook is orthodox, despite sometimes significant influence from the animist-Indic leaning abangan culture. In contrast to the priyayi and abangan, the santri will perform the five obligatory daily prayers, will fast during Ramadan, will strictly observe Islamic dietary restrictions, and if they are financially able, they will make the pilgrimage to Mecca. For them, Islamic law replaces the law of custom (adat) as basic guiding principles.

The santri generally view the abangan as Muslims who have "not received enough messages" about the true nature of Islam. The abangan are viewed as being on the lower rungs of the ladder leading towards Islamic orthodoxy.

Whereas the priyayi are identified with the government, and the abangan with the rural peasantry, the santri is classically identified as a small urban trader. The santri outlook is urban. They will often inhabit districts within cities known as kauman, close to a mosque and a marketplace.

Socially, as well as physically, the santri is somewhat separated or detached from the abangan mainstream. The santri is also perceived by the bulk of Javanese society as someone who has removed him or herself from the social and cultural environment, and indeed the santri lifestyle can seem extremely cloistered.

Indonesia Islam as a whole represents a force for ‘modernism’ in tension with the traditionalist abangan culture, offering its own conception of modernity which differs sharply from that projected by the contemporary priyayi, ie, the Golkar-Abri alliance.

Although the santri are often considered as a unitary group there are in fact two important tendencies – or poles – within Indonesia Islam, and indeed, world Islam. Confusingly, given the topic of this essay, these poles are the Traditionalist-Conservative and the Modernist-Progressive.

These poles represent the major dichotomy within the Islamic world, with the Traditionalist tendency having by far the strongest hold. Traditionalists consider themselves the true custodians of Islamic values, culture, and traditions. The West is viewed with suspicion and sometimes outright hostility. In view of the history of Western colonialism virtually all Islamic countries and the role of Islam in resisting colonialism, such rejectionism is probably not surprising. In Indonesia also, Islam played an important role as a force resistant to Dutch rule; Dutch values, institutions, technology and education were all viewed with a certain amount of distrust.

Many of the beliefs of the orthodox Indonesian Muslim are actually avatars from Javanism or local animistic traditions in the case of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. The average Indonesian Muslim may in good faith ascribe matters to Islam which are wholly alien to it and which come in fact from an older cosmology. This heterodoxy is probably a legacy of the Sufi missionaries who are considered to have first propagated Islam in the archipelago beginning several centuries ago. The Sufi missionary was prepared to incorporate local beliefs and practices into their Islamic message in order to win converts, and such an approach was certainly complementary to the Javanese syncretic tendency in particular. Thus emerged a uniquely Javanese expression of Islam. Indeed, Islam may not have taken root in Indonesia were it not for the syncretic and sometimes heretical Sufi missionary. The severe, dry, and comparatively bland Islam of Arabia would have encount ered little success in the archipelago.

For the past 70 years the orthodox pole of Indonesian Islam has been represented in the form of an organisation called Nadlathul Ulama (Council of Religious Scholars, NU). NU has deep roots in rural Java, in particular East and Central Java, with their power centred around the pesantren, or religious school. Each pesantren has a leader called a kyai. In the past, competition between some kyai was often intense, and based upon their respective perceived mystical powers. Some kyai even appropriates the role of dukun, claiming to be able to foretell the future, heal the sick, and perform magical superhuman feats.

Modernist Muslims, on the other hand, reject these syncretic accretions of the orthodox santri, and seek to ‘reform’ many of the practices and beliefs of the traditionalist. Modernist Islam is a ‘pure’ minimalist form of the religion, and seeks to replace folk traditions and parochial customs with customs and traditions closer to those expounded in the Quran and Hadith. The Modernist believes that these sources alone must be the basis of law and doctrine, as opposed to adat, and the "four schools of law" subscribed to by the orthodox stream. Thus, in a way, the Modernist is viewed as reformist, sometimes fundamentalist, and occasionally puritanical. The Modernist will see themselves as lights illuminating the dark traditionalist mindset, so naturally this missionary zeal can lead to a certain amount of tension and indignant resentment by the pious traditionalist.

The early Modernist movement in Indonesia was strongly influenced by Islamic scholars from Minangkabau, especially up until the foundation of Muhammadiyah in Yogyakarta in 1912 when the Modernist movement started to take its first steps in Java. Muhammadiyah grew slowly at first, facing opposition and indifference from the orthodox establishment, and sometimes even hostility and bitterness from the religious community. However, with the expansion of Muhammadiyah into Minangkabau the organisation grew rapidly in terms of both numbers and influence, and by the late 1930’s claimed a membership of 250,000 scattered throughout the archipelago. It operated 31 public libraries, and 1,774 schools, and a number of orphanages and poorhouses. According to Ricklefs (1993) the history of Indonesian Islamic Modernism after 1925 is to a large extent the history of Muhammadiyah.

In addition to promoting reform within orthodox Islam, Muhammadiyah also projected a forward-looking, pro-science, pro-Western approach and vision. From its very beginning Muhammadiyah has been avowedly ‘non-political’, openly stating its preference to remain a reformist and social organisation, despite dalliances in party politics in the 1950’s. Disavowals aside, Muhammadiyah is a highly influential political force in Indonesia, though not perhaps as strong as its traditionalist rival, Nadlathul Ulama. Nonetheless, the strength and influence of Muhammadiyah and Modernism in general has significantly increased in recent years, in particular since the early 1980’s. This growing influence of Modernism has led some to declare the "santrinisation of Indonesia", although Clifford Geertz himself in a recent interview in Gatra considers that this santrinisation process to be an exaggeration, and that this apparent strengthening of Islam in Indonesia is merely superficial and not wide-ranging in its impact. He cites the 1955 election results, and Masyumi’s surprising poor showing in that election, to be an example of a case where Islamic strength is exaggerated or over-emphasised.